

Visions of the Americas and Policies of Translation

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1. Emphasizing the difference.

In 1891 José Martí, the father of Cuba's Independence, published in the Argentinian newspaper „*La Nación*“ an essay with the title „*Our America*“. In this essay, circulated in the same year throughout Latin America, he attempted to characterize the Latin American Identity as the result of the mix of various elements such as European, indigenous and African. Each of these groups contributed to the construction of the subcontinental culture just as the adoption of classical and modern European elements did. Following Bolívar he asserted the unique mestizo character of Latin America's culture. He concluded:

"We came resolutely to the world of nations with our feet in the rosary, a white head and a body with the colours of the indians and creoles." (q. upon Zea, 1993, I:123).

He did not define Latin America's culture, but he characterized it by showing that it' is the opposite of the „*Other America's*“ culture, ie of the culture in Anglo-Saxon America¹.

This opposition has been constitutive for the Latin American culture throughout the twentieth century. The perception of the United States for the intellectuals and decision-makers in Latin America for the last hundred years has been complemented by their perception of the USA's will to exercise its power over the continent. They reacted in a contradictory way to this perceived will: time after time they either opposed it or adapted themselves to it. This ambiguous play has been determinant for the definition of Latin America's cultural identity and, in consequence, for the formulation of values, norms and symbolic images that were

¹ For some reference works on José Martí and his significance for the building of Latin American identity s. in the bibliography the works of Ette / Heydenreich, Fernández retamar and Zea.

intended to orientate their societies. Their view of the external world and perception of themselves were two complementary „visions“ in the sense that they contained both projections of their own and alien desires.

Nonetheless there has been a developmental path throughout the continental history of the twentieth century, which leads from the naive attitudes of the young Latin American states towards the US-American Intervention in the war of Cuban Independence through the bargaining policies of the nationalist regimes from the thirties until the seventies continuing with the radical hate of the revolutionary youth in the sixties and seventies to the disenchanted and sometimes cynical attitudes of the present. Each confrontation with the USA deepened the separation between both parts of the continent and in consequence their individualization. We cannot understand Latin America's contemporary identity without understanding these repeated confrontations with its Northern neighbour.

On the American side, in the meantime, the stereotypes of the lazy and boaster Mexicans, sleepy villages and latin-lovers went through the history of literature and cinema from the Cuban War to the end of the eighties. The bearded revolutionaries and bloodthirsty dictators completed since the fifties the image of a Latin America, which was unable to democratize their political life and to grow in a lasting way, but which was sensually and happy, as different to the white protestant, tenacious and distant.

But the American elites' image of Latin America included already since the Ibero-American Independence at the beginning of the nineteenth century a perception of the risks, which these supposed features could bring about for the national security of the United States: the weakness attributed to the new Southern nations could open the doors for extra-continental interventions, which on their side could put at risk the security of the American Republic². Since the proclamation of Monroe's Doctrine in 1823 one of the pillars of Washington's continental policies consisted in avoiding, that Latin American "weakness" could put at the risk more room of national security as regarded as acceptable. In this way since the beginning of the nineteenth century the perception by American people of its differences to Latin America is constituting as a very important part of the national identity of the United States. But as well as the perception of the Latin American Other, the continental policies of the United States has also constructed an ideal field to project to the exterior non-resolved

internal conflicts, specially for the exercise of racism, contributing in this way to the building of American identity (Campbell/Kean, 1997:248-49³).

Since the beginning of the nineteenth century American elites have been seeing in the subjection of Latin America as well the chance to carry out their mission to propagate the Liberty in the world as a good source for business as, last but not least, the means to ensure their own national defence. Puritan spirit dyed American presence in Latin America as “evangelization of the innocents”, if necessary, for their own good, through violence. Therefore several American administrations have been reacting energetically as the peoples of the continent were taking in their own hands the same Liberty and Democracy flags. This combination of peacefully penetration and violent subjection has been constituting American policies for the continent for almost the last two hundred years. Teddy Roosevelt’s “Big Stick’s policy” and Franklin Roosevelt’s “Good Neighbourhood’s” one are not two successive strategies, but two contradictory aspects constituting Washington’s policies for Latin America (Gellman, 1979; Tulchin, 1971).

I’m trying to show here the constituent character of this confrontation. To achieve this goal I will consider three phases from 1900 until the 1970s and end with a fourth, a view of the mutual perceptions between both Americas in the context of globalisation.

I have been developing this view of the search for identity in both Americas for the last seven years while I was teaching „*Latin American Culture and Society*“, first at the Institute for Translation and Interpretation at the University of Heidelberg and last year at the Department for Technical Communication at the University of Applied Sciences of Magdeburg. Now I am carrying together all elements of that pedagogical experience in a systematic reflection on All-American development. This is only the first step toward this construction.

In a parallel way and in interrelationship with this identity-building process I aim to show some characteristics of the translation practices between both areas. If the translator is “the invisible third” (Derrida, 1997 [1985]), who relating two cultures modifies both, the institutionally ensured continuity of determinate translating lines and moods expresses

² For reference works about the formulation of the Monroe Doctrine and its perception-background s. in the bibliography the works of Aguilar, May and Whitaker.

³ For further references about internal conflicts and world-perception by the formulation of American foreign policies s. in the bibliography the works of Hunt (1988), Rosenberg (1982) and Takaki (1979)

“policies of translation”⁴ with implications on both sides of the frontier. I will then here do some considerations on the “policies” of translating technical and economical texts between the United States and Latin America⁵

2. Theoretical background

I am basing my argument on a modified evolutionary view of the history of Latin America⁶. Human evolution depends on the ability of individuals and human groups to adapt themselves to changing conditions, to select between different alternatives, to vary these solutions by

⁴ In the broad sense attributed by M. Foucault to the concept of “politics” (Foucault, 1984; Minson, 1987; Wickham, 1987)

⁵ This restriction refers to my own experience as professor for the Translation of Technical Special Languages from German to Spanish at the University of Applied Sciences of Magdeburg, which led me to win important experiences about the reactions of the receivers of translated texts from a “superior” culture (Gémar, 1997). Analogically this experience led me also to important inferences about Latin American reactions to translated special languages texts from the USA.

⁶ Taking into account the hegemony achieved again by Evolutionism in the international scientific debate in the nineties, it is impossible to give here an account of the diversity of positions and questions covered by this label. I am approaching this matter with four provisos:

- a) The term “Evolution” names a systematization of the continuities and changes of natural and human organisms introduced and perfected since the nineteenth century under the conditions of the scientific praxis as it was led mainly in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Therefore is this term neither independent from the interrelationship between natural and human organism with each other and with the environment, nor can it be thought in its application to human societies independently from its conscious use by social actors. This term implies then a non-explicit discourse about continuity and change in Nature and Human Being. It means, that the scientific term is also an instrument of social action.
- b) Evolution has not an a priori stipulated purpose, but it begins at repeatedly appearing significant breakdowns in the information structure of organisms and develops until the complexity-degree contradicts radically their ability to adapt themselves to the environment.
- c) As Evolution has any a priori stipulated purpose, it isn’t possible to arrange a hierarchy between the different evolutionary ways, specially by human societies: all they represent particular answers to their special background, have different development times and have to be judged regarding their ability to satisfy own necessities without damaging alien developments.
- d) For these three mentioned reasons it is impossible to induce from evolution an immanent ethic. “Evolution” is therefore not the process itself, but the prevailing discourse about human development. However, as a scientific founded discourse, it allows various inferences with theoretical and practical consequences.

Regarding these four provisos I can give account of the three reasons, because I am applying here this method:

1. Because the high systematic level of its categories.
2. Because these let us to draw conclusions by analogy and homology from and in other knowledge fields, as well as to transfer conclusions from the ontogenetic to the phylogenetic approach. The actual hegemony of Evolutionism in the predominant scientific discourse have grounds principally in the development of information technologies and “historical natural sciences” (this denomination serves to differentiate some disciplines from other “non-historical” as chemistry and physics) in the last thirty years: palaeontology, biology, epidemiology, geology, climatology, oceanography, hydrology, astronomy, etc. These subjects can give us numerous elements for the knowledge of society, since, if we assert the historical character of social sciences, why can we not look for theoretical loans from other historical subjects?
3. Because this method allows to establish numerous relations with the materiality of the phenomena and works with the categories of causality and necessity.

Here following critically Diamond (1997: sp. chapters 1 and 2). For a succinct bibliography s. at the end of this article.

changing conditions and to ensure continuity. Through this ability these societies are increasing their knowledge of the world and of themselves, ie they are learning together.

As evolution depends on collective learning, it is a social process, which also brings about social stratification, inequality and violence. In order to hide these unintended consequences human societies reverse these relations in their view of the world through the psychological mechanisms of negation, projection, displacement and suppression⁷. These mechanisms lead to consensus-building around the dominant elites⁸. In accordance with Gramsci (1975, [1932]) I call this combination of domination and consensus "hegemony". As hegemony combines both elements and hides simultaneously violence, it is fundamental to collective identity-building. For my analysis of identity-building in the All-American continent in twentieth century I shall here concentrate my attention on the projection of Latin America's own conflicts on its view of the United States as an identity-building process.

These considerations have nevertheless a provisory character, then only dealing with the structure of monological exchange between both cultural spaces can be understood the roll of the views of each other for their identity-building⁹

Collective identity-building comes about in Western societies both in the individual and the collective fields through two repeated breakdowns: the first, which differentiates permanently "I" or "we" from the "Other" and the second, which differentiates "before" from "now". The differentiation regarding the Other is on its side carried out through two contradictory and complementary projections: a) the permanent reference to an external subject, which be

⁷ These are the constitutive aspects of an ideology theory as K. Lenk (1986) formulated it already fifteen years ago taking elements from psychoanalytical theory. In his theory ideology fills the place of the "I" in the Freudian theory. If we start from the two fundamental Lacan's statements ("Subject is an illusion" and "Unconscious structures itself as a discourse",), the critic of public discourses by means of the four mentioned categories could restore "the truth" of (individual or collective) Unconscious.

⁸ Following Foucault (1984) power is an strategic system to restore the control on Unconscious and ensure so the possibility of producing, putting in circulation and reproducing life. This system concentrates itself in determined nodal points contingently selected and on them it is possible to erect and to use the coercion and persuasion apparatuses, which are being need to impose power strategies. Therefore exists neither „the power“, but „power centres“ nor is it possible to „take the power“, but „to achieve the control of the or to create power centres“. It is about an strategic and tactic play with forces, which is oriented to restore strategic equilibrium through externalizing violence according to goals.

If restoration of equilibrium is an evolutionary question, it is also a cultural relative one. It means that the constitution of "the will to power" required to restore this equilibrium can only be cleared in an historical and cultural relative framework, which has to be researched under an action's approach.

⁹ For a first attempt in this direction s. forthcoming Vior (2001).

perceived as threatening (s. below) and b) the segregation (suppression or negation) of minorities in order to restore the lost symbolical unity.

The merely constitution of differences is not enough for the identity-building process: one or more symbolic cuts are necessary to construct the Other as alien. Without this transformation there is any marking out of the subject. As violence is almost always a constitutive factor of political communities and it has to be ideologically elaborated, identity-building processes go most through the projection of internal violence in the image of an threatening external Other.

On its side the differentiation between “before” and “now” is historically necessary to turn the contingent character of dominant ideas in an absolute one.

These identity-building processes occur also in the relations between the languages and, therefore, in the translating praxis.

Hierarchy of languages and translation

The differences between the languages are not neutral: they are part of power and domination relations, in which are being established hierarchies between them. These relations determine the difference and, therefore, the structure of the languages. As each language in its history as a cultural aspect is been inter-acting with other ones, each one shows signs of the effects of the power strategies exercised by the others. Translating is then not to carry away informations and meanings from one language to a different one, but to another, which generally was been or is being built through power relations.

I aim here to put some introductory reflections about the character of translation flow between the United States and Latin America and its implications for the identity-building processes at both sides of this cultural frontier. As it is about reflections on the basis of general studies about the relationship between both areas and the knowledge of the prevailing mentalities in the business world and the universities as the most extended reaction moods in Latin America in the face of the flows of technical and economical texts coming from the North, they have a provisory character, but a solid theoretical and historical basis.

The next research stage would then ought to be to collect historical and empirical documents in order to establish regularities and changes in the translation praxis between the Americas.

In spite of its great variations throughout the twentieth century it is possible by the translation of special technical and economical texts from the United States to Latin America to give account of the following permanent characteristics:

- a) In almost all activity-areas the one-directional way for translations from English to Spanish and Portuguese take precedence in around 90 per cent.
- b) Until the beginning of the 1980s one can notice a very bad morphological and syntactic level by the translated texts throughout all subjects and purposes.
- c) In all historical periods one can record by the (American) emitters an extended lack of concern for adapting the translations to the great lexical, dialectal and communicative variety prevailing in Latin America. This negligence results in the prevailing in these texts of an hybrid Cuban-Puertorican-Mexican register, which on its side results from the great availability in the USA on translators coming from these countries.
- d) One can also confirm generally the lack of concern of American companies to adapt their texts to Latin American mentality. They are still starting from the basis, that “American way of living, working and administrating” is desirable for all people and universally valid and it is then unnecessary to put it in rapport with the local circumstances.
- e) In this way they are more and more generating in Latin American public an enduring inferiority complex, a powerlessness feeling (one cannot buy other products or services as those, which are being imposed from the North) and a repeatedly necessity of “*secondary translation*”, ie to make up (oft through the fantasy) for the information lacks and the fragmentations of meaning in the texts coming from the USA.
- f) As a result of them American culture is being seen in Latin America in a mythical way and meanings are being taken on, which increase the heterogeneity of its cultures. Elitism, ethnocentrism and sexism are some of the consequences due to this policies of translation.
- g) But the ambivalence of the South in its reaction to the unilateral attitude of the North has also consequences for the identity-building process of the last one. In terms of facts the unability or unwill of the American politicians and managers to make understandable to Latin American people their intentions and goals throughout “the short twentieth century” (1898-1989) may be increased considerably their disenchantment with the Southern cultures and their tendency to impose their will

through violence. Although since the beginning of the seventies a changing perception of the difference is beginning to open its way through brilliant expressions in the literary and artistic translation-praxis, it still doesn't pierce business world's cuirass.

We are going now to consider the visions of the Americas during the twentieth century in order to retake the translational reflection at the end of this work.

Considering evolution as a collective learning process, the efficiency of the behaviour-rules inferred from this confrontation with the circumstances depends on their ability to restore the internal equilibrium and to help the acting groups to adapt themselves to the changing environment. Nevertheless this can so radically change, that adaption by meaning of the learned rules falls through and/or the restoration of internal equilibrium is impossible. In these cases new action-rules have to be introduced and their application leads to a new understanding of the world, ie to new meanings.

To establish the meaning of an historical process presupposes then to fix its significant breakdowns¹⁰. Therefore I have organized the history of the mutual perceptions of the United States and Latin America in three great stages, which at their time are determined by four significant breakdowns.

3. The visions of the Americas in the twentieth century

„The short twentieth century“, as E. Hobsbawn (1994) called it, was not as short in Latin America as in Europe. It already began in 1898 with the US-American Intervention in the Cuban Independence War against Spain and ended at Christmas 1989, as the US-Army killed 4,000 civilians in Panama in the search for their ex-friend General Noriega. This act demonstrated to the whole continent who the master was during the conservative restoration beginning 1982 (Mexican debt crisis and Falkland War) and after the end of Cold War.

First breakdown: the rise of a great continent

As the United States intervened in the Cuban War in April 1898, they did it with the conviction, that, after the suppression of the last indigenous upheaval 1890 and having achieved the control of their internal space, their mission to propagate the Liberty all over the

¹⁰ On the concept „significant breakdowns“ s. Chiaramonte, 1982.

world required from them to end colonialism in the Western hemisphere and to put order in the administration and the economies in the Caribbean basin. In the geopolitical understanding of that time the “disorder” in this region threatened the giant’s “abdomen” (Koenig, 1992:409-18; Rosenberg, 1982; Zuleta, 1998).

The intellectual reaction to this intervention all over the continent began immediately after with the famous speech Paul Groussac’s (the French founding director of the National Library in Buenos Aires) titled “*Caliban’s spirit*”, to which followed shortly afterwards the world-known Nicaraguan poet Ruben Darío’s “*Caliban’s victory*” (first published in New York) and two years later the young Uruguayan journalist José E. Rodó’s “*Ariel*”, a continental best-seller with a lasting impact. All three received the Shakespearian motive from “*The Storm*” in the elitist version which Ernest Renan popularized in 1878. The antinomy Ariel-Caliban, brought into line with spiritualism-materialism one allowed Latin American intellectuals to incorporate French discourse about “Latinity” and to turn the continent’s material backwardness into a virtue, without having to worry about the necessary social reforms¹¹. “Arielism” based history’s first “Latin-Americanism” as opposed to “Yankee” spirit. Latin American intellectuals were looking for literary and mythical motives to show their political action’s will, because they did find it neither in the history nor in the social reality of their peoples (Fernández Retamar, 1995 [1971]; Vior, 2000).

But the most important American intellectuals, as John Dewey and William James, didn’t look at that time toward past, but to the future. Their pragmatism pushed them to the universally realisation of the “liberated Jerusalem”, as the United States saw themselves. However it is necessary to point out the humanist character of James’ universalism, who already during the Cuban War expressed his protest against the imperialistic character of American intervention (Zuleta, 1998; Koenig, 1990:414-15). This contradiction between expansionist universalism and humanistic liberalism characterized the internal discussions on the American continental policies throughout the twentieth century (Hunt, 1988).

¹¹ In his essay „*Caliban’s victory*“ (1878) Ernest Renan had proposed the antinomy Ariel-Caliban as a metaphor for the opposition between elites and democratic “common herd”. These conservative connotations were modified by Rodó’s ethical attitude, who saw in “the government of the bests through their intelligence and education” the necessary corrective for the massification already succeeding in the USA. Rodó’s work had a great influence on the building of Latin American identity. Recent appreciations are seeing him as the founder of Latin American philosophy (Acosta, 2000; fernández Retamar, 1995 [1971]; Vior, 2000).

The Mexican Revolution from 1910 to 1920, the first victorious agrarian and social revolution worldwide in the twentieth century, modified the confrontational axe proposed by Rodó ten years before: instead of a contradiction between spiritualism and materialism it focused the intellectual and political attention on the contradiction between the attempt to build a Mexican national State and the U.S. expansionism in Central America and the Caribbean. The continental university-reform movement after 1918 on the other hand emphasized Martí's assertions on the relation between an education for all people grounded in regional traditions, justice and freedom. This triangle (national state-building, egalitarian education and distributive justice) was regarded from 1920 to 1980 by the reformers and revolutionaries all over the continent as the main instrument for political progress. Not individuals but the reformatory state has the responsibility to promote social development. The continent regarded this new view of itself based on an ethic of justice as opposed to US-American pragmatism and thus consolidated the first autonomous view of Latin American culture and politics. The perception of "imperial America" founded the vision of "free Latin America". David could defeat Goliath.

Second breakdown: developing nationalism and bargaining

The world-wide economic crisis in 1930, the need to satisfy the consumption requirements of a growing urban population, the influence of anti-liberal movements in Europe as alternative ideologies to dominant Anglo-Saxon liberalism and the will to build an independent bargaining power in world politics during and after the Second World War influenced the rise of „*popular nationalism*“ in the major Latin American countries Brazil, Mexico and Argentina (Anderle, 1992). From 1930 until 1982 „*popular nationalism*“ determined the political and cultural life throughout the continent. It was an integrative, modernizing nationalism, which included the search for Latin American unity and sought a balanced bargain with the United States, which was seen as ambitious, unilaterally business-oriented, but rational and able to negotiate (Carmagnani, 1992; Vior, 1984).

This nationalism (Vior, 1985) represented a peculiar way to achieve modernization, internal integration and differentiation from the external world. It expanded the urban market, accelerated industrialization and promoted social policies. But it excluded (except in Argentina, where there was any significant peasantry) the rural population and was strongly authoritarian. In its attempt to construct „national unity“ it polarized political and cultural life and subsumed all social contradictions in a few leaders. Vargas, Cárdenas and Perón were its

main representatives. Although succeeding in the economic growth, social and educational affairs, it proved in the end unable to build an alternative to the growing international influence of the USA in the post-war era. Nationalist action doesn't need external conceptual frameworks for its legitimation, but it searches it in the action and in their leader's discourses¹² sufficient justification in itself. In this way the "popular nationalist" leaders and intellectuals explained their defeat in the fifties and sixties exclusively in terms of the US-interventions. It was the period of the Cold War and US diplomats and agents made frequent interventions. However, as indicated below, the fall of nationalist regimes in Latin America had more complex causes.

Third breakdown: revolution and total negation

The frustration about the non-executed nationalistic reform promises and the faltering development strategies in the fifties, the ideological confrontation in the Cold War, the US intervention in Guatemala in 1954 and the Cuban Revolution in 1959 led to a radical turn of nationalism and the expansion of anti-imperialism. The growing popular demands for structural reforms and the rise of a rebellious intellectual youth made the emergence of revolutionary movements possible (Aguilar, 1968; Hunt, 1988; Koenig, 1992:454-73; Whitaker, 1954).

On its side the United States reacted to Cuban Revolution with an hysteric militarization of the Inter-American relations. The radical turn of the confrontation with Castro in 1959-61 and his alliance with the Soviet Union sharpened the American perception for eventual dangers coming from overseas. Protest and popular upheavals in the continent were not longer perceived by US-public opinion and decision-makers as internal problems, but as part of a communist global plan for the take-over of the Western hemisphere. In this way the US-Administrations, from Kennedy to Reagan, submitted all items of their policies for Latin America to the strategic necessities of Cold-War-fighting. For the Latin American countries this perception implied, that in many countries the military overthrew the civilian governments and erected dictatorial regimes or put these under its control or, in other ones, the civilian administrations adopted strongly repressive measures in front of popular protests in order to prevent military or direct US-interventions (Collier, 1979; Linz / Stephan, 1978; Loveman / Davies, 1978; Malloy, 1977; O'Donnell, 1972; Petras / La Porte, 1973, Tapia V., 1980).

¹² For an analysis of the structure and functions of popular nationalist discourses s. Vior (1984, Ch. 4, 6

In face of this polarization of the Inter-American relations old nationalistic leaders and elites were most unable to react efficiently, at the same time satisfying popular demands, controlling revolutionary upheavals, confronting American pressures and continuing economic growth. Therefore between the end of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies arose the break between the reformist and revolutionary elites throughout the continent.

The bloody repression of the student movement at the "Tlatelolco Place" in Mexico City in October 1968 and the public Montoneros' break with Peron in May 1974 in Buenos Aires were steps which marked the separation of the revolutionary generation from their political parents. The youth accepted the old nationalistic view of the internal and external fractures in Latin America's societies, but blamed the earlier generation for making compromises with the elites and the USA.

As regards these anti-imperialist, nationalist and socialist movements, the USA was structurally unable to accept reforms in Latin America and only their defeat could open the way for freedom and equality. The Algerian War against France and the Vietnam War seemed to confirm this supposition (Vior, 1991: Ch. 13).

The total mutual negation between the US-Administrations and the revolutionary youth modified continental dichotomy's character: from the beginning of the sixties the Second Declaration of Havana (1962) and the National Security's Doctrine replaced the earlier combination of negotiation and conflict through a war-climate.

There is any causal relationship between the gradually setting up of a fix combination between "economic development and national security" in the United States' policies for Latin America from 1947 to 1961 and the radical turn of the Latin American anti-imperialism in the same time. There are rather factors, which were let by side in its ideological development, as the modernization of the most important Latin American towns, which at its side brought about the growth of middle classes without place in the power structure, the sharpening of Cold War, the greater international influence of the Soviet Union, the Cuban revolution, the crisis of the Catholic Church and the radical turn of the modernity-crisis in the industrial countries, the ones, which among others, let arise in Latin America a critical

attitude toward anti-imperialistic reformism of the earlier decades and the conviction, that it was possible to put up a new power on the revolutionary way.

The revolutionary anti-imperialism never developed its political and social programmes in order to turn it into governmental strategies. By doing it its elites would have had to formulate global orientations, ie to decide on symbolic and normative frameworks. Their heroic relates and the repeatedly affirmation of their will to power replaced explaining discourses.

Their view of the continental unity can be considered as cesarist and close to bolivarism (following Simon Bolivar's ideas and action paths), because they expected from liberating military action simultaneously the creation of revolutionary consciousness and their own legitimacy as leading elite. Their mythification of the revolutionary ethics and ambioned "new human being" (both aspects with deep Christian roots) are reminiscent of Latin American traditions from the Independence time and civil wars in the nineteenth century, but also of missionary spirit in the sixteenth century.

However, although condemning the arrogance of the revolutionary elites, you cannot deny the intellectual flourishing brought about by the new movements, at least until the revolutionary élan came down to merely terrorism. Throughout Latin America these was the time for the renaissance of Utopia. Regarding it has the continent's South a long tradition, but in these years it was showed in an explosive way: in the literature, music, arts, advertising and design there arose many innovative creators, who were attempting to articulate originally languages.

Throughout both Americas the cultural apparatuses were paralysed in their legitimately function by the counter-cultural movements and (specially in the USA) the movement against the Vietnam War. The alliance of the middle-classes revolutionary youth with the popular protest de-constructed the dominant cultural and nation's images and settled the basis for new popular-national identities. But this settlement had either no time to arrive to new systematic formulations because of the military coups after 1973 or the leading elites stopped it.

The Latin American revolutionary movements between the 1960s and the 1980s remained in the end dependent on the world view of the old nationalist movements. After the first oil-crisis 1973 and the American defeat in Vietnam 1975 revolutionary elites in Latin America

were unable to understand the new trends of capitalist recovery and scientific-technological development.

As unilaterally and moralist their capitalism-critics was, as fundamentalist was the conservative revival in Great Britain and the United States in the second half of the seventies who led to the empowerment of Margaret Thatcher 1979 and Ronald Reagan 1981.

4. The end of the dichotomy and the building of post-national identities

Precisely this President took in the eighties in charge organizing the conservative restoration throughout the continent. The so-called “globalisation”, the dominant discourse about the new expansionist phase of capitalism, weakened the national states all over the continent and submitted it to decision-making in Washington or Wall Street. Nationalism collapsed and the majority of Latin American governments hastened their adoption of neoliberal policies. The continent was reorganized by the great international corporations through their investments in export-oriented agriculture based on bio-technologies, giant infrastructural works, mining and finances. After the debt-crisis, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the replacement of military dictatorships in South America by weak democracies a sense of fragility and lack of orientations infected Latin American thought. The USA have been appearing as an absolute dominator, any resistance seemed senseless. To the penetration of “turbo-capitalism” (Ramonet, 2000, V:1) far into Latin America’s last corners corresponds the extension of intensive security controls throughout the social weave. The new American ruling regime over the continent shows intensely totalitarian brush strokes.

Who integrates too much, breaks up. The end of the nationalisms and the new absolutist character of the imperial discourse have been bringing about in Latin America an extended weakness-feeling and the confusion in conceptual thinking. The dissolution of the national states caused the disappearance or de-legitimizing of its referential setting. In the face of this crisis the elites and Latin American intellectuals have been again fluctuating according to their old dynamics: either submitting themselves hurriedly to the supposed American plans or withdrawing from the debate.

As the Latin American economies grew at high rates in the first half of the nineties the neo-conservative governments seemed to be in the right. But the “Americanization” of Latin American societies is multiplying the quantity and variety of the segregated groups which are

organizing non-national, ethnic, regional, religious, mafia-looking and/or revolutionary identities. These signs of social dissolution are involving also the search for new post- or non-national meanings and marking out Latin America's internal frontiers.

At the same time the dissolution of national states and the crisis of continental identity based on them are being accompanied by the rapid expansion of Latin American cultural space very right inside of the United States. The "dollarization" of Latin American economies and the importance, that these economies are winning for the American companies are leading for one part to an internalization of Latin American economic problems by the USA. For the other part the unstoppable migration from South and the accelerated growth of the Spanish-speaking minority in the United States are introducing in its society the typical problems of the Latin American cultural space. In this way the external frontiers of the Latin American cultural space are been extended 3.000 miles toward North.

Since 1823 the United States have asserted repeatedly their right to make the continent their ward, for what they have been justifying themselves through their universal mission, the necessities of their national security and the interests of their corporations. But this triple justification supposed that Latin America is external to the space of American cultural and political praxis. In this way these could "export" their internal conflicts and "filter" through their cultural apparatuses the repercussions on their society of the violence exercised abroad (Campbell/Kean, 1997:loc. cit.). Actually they have extended their frontiers to all continental bends and converting Latin America's conflicts in the owns ones.

The dichotomy USA-Latin America, as it during ninety years served to outline both cultural identities, has disappeared. Instead of it **new frontiers** arose. One cannot still conceive this frontiers' replacement in the traditional sense of customs and rangers. It is a process, which has still not crystallized neither found its limits, but which is progressing hurriedly to their fixation.

This dissolution of national statehood may open the way for the appearance of a new Latin America's common project. A new continentalism can give meaning to the multiple searches for identity. This way presupposes a new, more detached Latin American approach to the United States. The Latin American governments and the media powers have created the assumption in the nineties that nothing could be done against the superpower. Obedience

seemed to be the only possible course. Nevertheless multiple expressions of rebellion are showing a need for internal differentiation and individualization from the external world. Instead of experiencing fear or the need of violent confrontation, many people in Latin America are beginning to feel the need to understand the United States in order to compete successfully with it, to prevent unnecessary conflicts and to plan their own development.

In the last century we, Latin Americans, oscillated between our search for recognition by and our hate for the USA. Concerned with the marking out of our cultural identity, we neglected the scientific study of American society. The double frontiers-slide already described make now impossible and/or suicide this omission. At the same time, preoccupied with the recovery of our language, history, archaeology and arts, we lost sight of the scientific and technical revolution since the seventies. The destruction of cultural weaving in the most austral countries in the same years complicated even more this job.

But also American politics and culture need a reality-bath: the USA cannot resolve their minorities-question without a new, more differentiated approach to Latin America. They have to understand that from now on Latin American problems are also the own ones, if they don't want to introduce the ancient dichotomy inside their borders.

The same can be said about theory, didactic and translation-praxis. Latin American theoreticians cannot expect from the American and European colleagues to be helped by the de-construction of their texts in order to adapt them to the receiver's necessities in the Southern countries. Neither can American text producers expect that these are understood in South without inter- and re-contextualizing them according to the recipient's own circumstances. Specially in technical and economical translation's field it is necessary to go on to a translation-praxis guided by the receiver's necessities. Without to fall in folk-modes and ethnical asserts the translation of these kinds of texts have to be oriented:

- 1) To Iberic-American pragmatism. The purposes of the texts ought to be clear already from their beginning.
- 2) To the polysemy of Romanic languages¹³.
- 3) To restoring con- and inter-textual references in order to permit the critics of the outgoing-texts.

¹³ Taking also into account the growing interferences of Amerindian languages and, in selected regions, translating also in these languages.

- 4) To complement and supplement the outgoing-texts through the orality-discourses, which are constitutive elements of Latin American identity (Berg, 2000).
- 5) To make relative the European and American space-time-notions, in order to reset them in context inside Latin American patterns: space and time are in the Latin American white and mestizo cultures subjective and in the Indigenous and Afro-Latin American ones part of the relationship between humans, mythical and religious world and nature.

The whole American continent is actually moving forward toward new mixed forms. The breakdown of the dams between both Americas is opening the doors for the re-definition of both parts. The differences between them will not disappear, because they have phylo- and ontogenetical causes, but from their new definition will depend the future relationship between both cultural spaces: mutual recognition or negation.

If social evolution is a matter of learning, we have perhaps now to begin to study the continent as a whole. May be, we have to overcome the division between “American” and “Latin American studies” and begin to study both parts in their inter-connection, also in their relations with Indigenous- and Afro-America. The same is valid for the linguistic and translational studies. Only when American and Latin American intellectuals (in the broadest sense of the term) begin to recognize mutually as equal, different and inter-dependent, the continent will have definitively overcome its dichotomy North-South.

Bibliography

In this bibliography I don't try to mention all works needed for the redaction of this text, but only those, which I can recommend because their suggestive ideas, their synthesis and/or because they refer to parallel discussions, which normally we, who research about society, culture or thought, don't pay a major attention.

I have classified this bibliography in five sections: in the first I name the basic works for the redaction of my text; in the followings I mention some reference works for the discussion on the actual trends in evolutionist theory, power and politics, translation-theory, identity-building in Latin America and the United States' policies for the continent.

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